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Case No.
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOSE F. MONTOYA I

Appellant,

vs.
BERTHANA INVESTMENT CORPORATION I INC.
and ROBERT E. SANDERS and SHIRLEY M.
SANDERS, husband and wife,

I

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for wrongful death resulting from
D<"rsona 1 injury sustained by the deceased at a public roller

:;1<.0ting rink in Ogden, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court sustained a motion for Summary

judgment filed by the defendant, Berthana Investment
Corporation, Inc., which motion was based upon the
pleadings, the affidavit, and on the briefs filed in said
matter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plain tiff seeks reversal of the order dismissing
plaintiff's case as to the said defendant, Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc., and remanding the case to the
lower Court for trial.
STA TE MENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, father of the deceased, filed his
complaint for damages against both the Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc., as owner and lessor of the
premises known as the "Berthana Ballroom and Rollerskating Rink" and against Robert E. Sanders and Shirley M.
Sanders, husband and wife, as lessees and as managers
and operators of the skating rink. (R. l)
For purposes of this brief, the defendant, Berthana
lrivestment Corporation, Inc., will be referred to as
Berthana (lessor) and the defendants, Robert E. Sanders
and Shirley M. Sanders will be referred to as Sanders
2.

(lessees) .
The a mended Complaint (R. 15) alleges that
r..,nnie Montoya, age 11, paid an admission charge and

received permission to rollerskate on said premises and
while skating was pushed or fell violently against one of
the protruding

~rmrests

described in the complaint and

suffered injury to his kidneys as a result of which he
died from interna 1 bleeding later the same day.
The answer of the defendant, Berthana, to the
original complaint was a general denial and alleged contributory negligence by way of defense.

(R. 2)

The

answer of the defendants, Sanders, was basically the same
except for the defense of assumption of risk and the further
allegation that the accident was caused by negligence of
third persons not parties to the action.

(R. 4)

Thereafter,

the defendant, Berthana, filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds "that the answer of the defendant,
l~obert

E. Sanders to the plaintiff's interrogatories and the

dttached affidavit of the eye witness, Alma Clare, conclusively show as a matter of law that the plaintiff does not
have a claim against this defendant
3.

II

(R. 12)

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint,· (R. 15) and
the defendants, Sanders, filed their answer to the amended
complaint. (R. 16)

The defendant, Berthana, renewed its

motion for Summary Judgment

(R. 17) which was granted

by the lower Court.

The facts as set forth in the

(R. 23)

amended complaint (R. 15) and which are the basis of this
action against the defendant, Berthana, are as follows:
A. It leased the premises for dancing and rollerskating purposes only;
B. It knew that the public would be patrons of
the rink and would pay admission for said use;
C. It would allow no alterations of the premises
by lessee without prior written consent of the lessor;

D. It knew that the hall was specifically designed
for dancing only and was used by the public for that

exclusive purpose for a number of years;
E. It knew or should have known that wooden armrests extended outwards towards the da nee floor from
benches around the floor;
F. It knew that said premises were now being used
by

the public for both dancing and rollerskating;
4.

G. It knew that a large number of persons,
including children, would be admitted to said premises
as patrons for skating;
H. It knew that there was no proper railing or
other protective device to prevent skaters from falling into
or being pushed against said armrests which constituted a
risk to skaters using the rink;

I. It knew that the Sanders (Lessees) would use
said premises for skating ptr poses before the area could
be put in a reasonably safe condition and that lessees

wruld not make such changes;

J. That both defendants knew, or should have
known, of the hazards in the construction of said area
when used for skating purposes and of the possibility of
injury to persons skating there, especially to children; and
K.

That the deceased, while skating on said rink,

was pushed or fell violently against one of the protruding
Jrmrests and suffered personal injuries as a result of
Which he died .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
5.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, BERTHANA
INVESTMENT CORPORATION

I

INC.

I

AND AGAINST THE

PLAINTIFF

To justify the lower Court in granting the motion
for Summary Judgment, it was necessary to find that as a

matter of law there was no negligence on the part of the
landlord as owner of the premises and that it owed no duty
to the deceased. We ·submit that the facts above alleged

and which, for purposes of this motion must be deemed to
be true, show negligence and that a question of fact for the
jury

has been raised.

The most recent case handed down by

the Utah State Supreme Court relating to the matter of
Summary

Judgment is Singleton vs. Alexander et al. (1967)

431 P(2) 126, 19 U. (2) 292.

The opinion states in part as

follows:
"It will be noted that a summary judgment can
be granted only when it is shown that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under those facts. The
Court cannot consider the weight of testimony
or the credibility of witnesses in considering a
motion for summary judgment. He simply
determines that there is no disputed issue of
6.

material fact and that as a matter of law a
party should prevail . . . "
and, " . . . However, when it comes to determining negligence, contributory negligence,
and causation, courts are not in such a good
position to make a total determination of its
own, and that is: Did the conduct of a party
measure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause
of the harm done? See Moore, Federal
Practice, paragraphs 56 .15 (1. -0), P. 2285,
and 56.17(42), P. 2583; Barron and Holtzoff,
Fed. Pr. & Procedure. Paragraph 1232.l, p. 106."
We submit that the issues raised by this case are not such

that "a 11 reasonably men must draw the same conclusions
from

them."
Just what is the duty of lessor of premises?
The correct rule in the present case is to be found

in

32 Am. Jr., page 533, which, after defining the general

rule between the landlord and tenant, then states:

"It is well settled that where the lease is
for a public purpose, such as for a theater,
the liability of the landlord for injuries from
defects in the condition of the demised
premises is not governed by all of the rules
applying to leases generally. Where there
is a lease for a purpose involving use by
the public, the rights of business patrons
to recover for injuries from defects in the
demised premises are not limited to the
rights of the tenant. There are a number of
decisions which hold that where the property
7.

_is leased for public or semipublic purposes,
and at the time is not safe for the purposes
intended, and the owner knew, or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence would have
known, of such conditions, he is liable to
~he patrons of such premises for damages
resulting from such conditions, for it is his
duty to make such property reasonably safe
for the purposes intended, or to discontinue
the conditions, as the case may be." (Italics
ours)
We also call attention to 123 ALR 868 which deals
with leases for a particular purpose, and cites with approval
•Restatement of the Law of Torts, paragraph 359. It states:
"A lessor who leases land for a purpose
which involves the admission of a large
number of persons as patrons of his lessee,
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to them by an artificial condition existing
when the lessee took possession, if the lessor
(a) knew or should have known of the condition
and realized or should have realized the unreasonable risk to them involved therein, and
(b) had reason to expect that the lessee would
admit his patrons before the land was put in a
reasonably safe condition for their reception."
See also 123 ALR, 872 which defines the responsibitity of the lessor of places of amusement.
"III Leases for particular purposes.
a. Places of amusement. Places of amusement
constitute an exception to the general rule of
caveat emptor with respect to a landlord's
liability to those who enter upon the premises in
the right of the tenant. It is generally recog-

8.

nized that the lessor of the property for public
amusement purposes owes to the public, at least
as to latent defects, the duty of exercising
ordinary care to provide against defects in the
premises which render them unsafe for the use
intended. This includes defects in construction, defects caused by the property being in
a state of disrepair at the time of the lease,
or a condition which, in the nature of things,
must ultimately result in the property being
dangerous when put to the use intended."
(Ita li cs ours)
The question now before the Court is whether the
landlord knew or should have known that persons using
a dance floor for rollerskating purposes might sustain
injury if projected into protruding armrests which, under
these circumstances, could be a hazard if not an actual

nuisance, as to patrons using it. We submit that this is
a question of fact and to be determined by a jury.
Rollerskating in a public rink used for that purpose
by its nature is a hazardous sport.

It becomes so by the

actions and conduct of young people. It is common knowledge that children will engage in racing around the rink;

cutting in and out around other skaters; playing games
s~1ch

as "crack the whip"; and skating faster than they

'l")Uld.

A landlord leasing the premises for skating
9.

purposes and knowing said premises were designed for
ballroom dancing should and could have foreseen that
kids would engage in horseplay and that protruding armrests were dangerous and hence a nuisance if a skater
were projected into one of them and sustained injury as
happened in this case.
The Utah case of Larsen vs. Calder Park Company,
(1919) 180 P. 599, 54 U. 325, is a key case on the LessorLessee relationship and correctly states the law which we
deem to be applicable and controlling in this case. The
case was tried before the Court with a jury and a verdict
rAndered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
The judgment was affirmed.
In many respects the Calder Park case closely
parallels the present case, both as to fact and as to the
application of the law.

In that case the defendant leased

an amusement park to the lessee for entertainment of the
pc1blic for profit.
Js a

One of the leased buildings was used

shooting gallery and was constructed by the lessor

:r ar1y years before the accident in question.
1

As plaintiff

'<,;s Wdlking along a path a bullet glanced from a target
10.

through a hole or crack in the wall of the gallery and
struck a boy in his eye, causing permanent injury.
Appellant, lessor, admitted its ownership of the
park and that it executed the written lease as alleged in

the complaint and denied the other allegations.
Counsel

in that case, as now, asserted:

" . . . that the general rule is that there is no
implied warranty on the part of a landlord that
leased premises are in a safe condition, or
that he will ke.ep the premises repaired or in
a safe condition; and that, in the absence of
an express covenant on the part of the landlord to maintain the premises in repair, it is
generally held that neither the tenant nor a
guest of the tenant has any right of action
against the landlord for injuries sustained by
reason of defects in the premises where there
was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part
of the landlord leasing the premises; that the
overwhelming weight of authority is to the
effect that, where property at the time of the demise is not a nuisance, and an injury happens
by some act of the tenant or while the tenant
has the entire possession or control of the
premises, the owner is not liable."
Our Court in answer to this stated:
"No doubt the law is properly reflected in
the excerpt quoted from Taylor, but the
quotation has no application to this case for
the reason that here the shooting gallery
building, at the time it was leased by the
appellant, was in such a condition that it
constituted a quiescent nuisance.
11.

. . . it is manifest that by using the building
which was intended for use as a shooting
gallery and which was leased for that purpose,
in the condition it was in when leased, . . . "
"It was the unsafe condition of the building
as leased, however, which would expose the
passer-by to danger and not the sole act of
the tenant, for the reason that, if the tenant
used the building at a 11 as a shooting gallery
in the condition in which it was, the danger
would certainly be constantly imminent."
Whether or not· the protruding armrests would expose
skaters to danger; as they did here, is a question for the jury
Certainly they constituted a "quiescent nuisance" as defined
by the Court .

Our Supreme Court then cited with approval 16 RCL,
para. 594,p. 1076 as follows:

"It is the well-settled rule that the landlord is
properly chargeable with liability to a stranger
where the cause of injury to the latter is a nuisance existing on the premises at the time of
the demise. No person can create or maintain a
nuisance upon his premises and escape liability
for the injury occasioned by it to third persons.
Nor can a lessor so create a nuisance and then
escape liability for the oonseguences by leasing
the premises to a tenant. Nor is it material that
the negligence of the latter contributed to the
injury; that may render the lessee also liable,
but it cannot exempt the lessor from liability.
Indeed, the nuisance may be merely passive until
some agency of the lessee intervenes, and the
Lessor will still be liable. The theory upon
which the landlord is held to be liable where
12.

the premises are leased with a nuisance is that
he created the nuisance, and will be presumed
to have intended the continuance thereof, or
that he acquired title with an existing nuisance
and knowingly leased them in that condition. In
either case the a ct of lea sing with the nuisa nee
is held to raise the presumption that he intended
the nuisance to be continued. Prior to and at the
time of the lease, it was the duty of the lessor to
put an end to the nuisance. If he fails to do
this, and leases the premises with the nuisance on
them, he may be deemed, and is deemed, to authorize the continuance of the nuisance, and is
therefore liable for the conseguences of such
continuance. Whether, therefore, the defect is
one of origina 1 construction, or arises from a
failure to repair, or from the maintenance on
the premises of any condition endangering the
health or safety of strangers, whatever its nature,
if it continues a nuisance, the lessor will be
responsible for its conseguences if he leases the
premises with the nuisance upon them, and thus
authorizes its continuance.* * *" (Ita lies Ours)
In the present case there is a striking similarily to
that case in the application of the foregoing rule.

The

agency of the lessee which intervened and was injured was,
of course, the deceased boy.

until then.

The nuisance was passive

There is no question but what the lessor

(Berthana) leased the premises in a condition which enrlangered the hea Ith and safety of strangers, whatever its
11rJture, and that it is responsible for the consequences.

The opinion also cites with approval Section 597
13 •

(supra) which states:
"It is not always necessary in order that the
landlord may be held liable for injuries resulting
from a nuisance on the leased premises that the
cause of the injury be in and of itself a nuisance
at the time of the lease. Leases are made with
a view to the use of the premises leased, and if
the injury to the person or property of a stranger
is the result of the reasonable, ordinary, and
contemplated manner of use of the premises, the
lessor will be responsible therefor, although unused,
and as they stood at the time of the demise, the
premises were not, of themselves, a nuisance."
The Court also pnswers the question of public policy
as it relates to the lea sing of property to a tenant for a

public use as was done in this case. It said:

"Where property is leased to a tenant for a
public use the care required by the landlord
should be of a higher degree than when the
property is let for private purposes. Public
_Eolicy demands such care for the protection of
the public, and this is particularly applicable
here in Utah, where public resorts and amusement
.Q9rks are numerous and their attractions varied
and alluring." (Ita lies ours)
With reference to "nuisances" the Court approved
the following from Joyce, Law of Nuisances, Para. 464, as
rollows:

"The lessors or owners of buildings or structures in which public exhibitions and entertainments are designed to be given, and for admissions to which the lessors directly or indirectly
receive compensation, are subject to a different

rule from that in the ordinary cases of leasing
of buildings, in that while there is in the latter
no implied warranty on the part of the lessor
that the buildings are fit and safe for the purposes for which they are used yet in the former
case the lessors or owners of such buildings or
structures hold out to the public that the structures are reasonably safe for the purposes for
which they are let or used, and impliedly undertake that due care has been exercised in their
erection, and such lessor having created an unsafe and dangerous structure, and not having
performed his duty in exercising the proper degree of care to know that it was safe, he is
liable to a person injured by reason of its being
unsafe or of improper and faulty construction
whereby it constitutes a nuisance." {Italics ours)
This statement seems to indicate that there is an
~plied warranty on the part of the lessor that the building
'

~fit

and safe for the purposes for which they are leased if

!

I

~public exhibitions or amusement and where admission is

~rged from which the lessor directly or indirectly receives
I

~mpensation.

Isubstantial.

Such is the case here. The rental in the lease

In conclusion the Court disposed of the question

IProximate

cause. It cited with approval the following

~0 tetaken from Milwaikee &St. P.R.R. Co. vs. Kellogg,
lr:.s. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256, cited in Anderson vs.
!lt1niore & Ohio Ry. Co., 74W. Va. 21, 81 S. E. 581,
15.

"IL. R. A. (N.S.) 892, in which it poses this question:

"The question always is: Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful a ct
and the injury, a continuous operation? Did
the facts constitute a continuous succession
of events, so linked together as to make a
na tura 1 whole, or was there some new and
independent cause intervening between the
wrong and the injury?"
Of course, the cause of injury and death was the
existence of the armrest which split his kidney. If the armrest had not existed or had been protected would he have
suffered such injury?

The answer is obviously no.

The

cause which set the others in motion, the cause of causes,
and without which the accident would not have occurred was
the condition of the armrest on the bench.

The Court in the Calder case properly stated:
"According to the evidence in this case there
was an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury--between the nuisance
and the unfortunate result. The question is:
Was the dilapidated condition of the so-called
shooting gallery the ca usa sine qua non?
If the cause had not existed, would the injury
have taken place? If the wall had been properly protected and there had been no holes
or cracks in the wall, would the fragment of
lead have struck the respondent in the eye
and blinded him? It is true that there was a
concurring ca use, but the cause which set the
others in motion, the ca use of causes, and without
'

16.

which the accident would not have occurred,
was the condition of the shooting gallery
wall."
In the case of Gibson vs . Shelby County Fair
Association et al., 44 N. W., (2), 362 (1950) the Supreme
Court of Iowa quoted with a pprova 1 the case of Junkerman
vs. Tilyou Realty Co., where Justice Cardozo speaking for
the New York Court of Appeals stated:

"We may say that those who enter a structure
designed for public amusement are there at the
invitation, not only of the lessee who maintains it, but also of the lessor who has leased
it for that purpose, and that the latter's liability
is merely an instance of the general rule which
charges an owner of property with a duty toward
those whom he invites upon it. (Citing Cases.)
We may say more simply, and perhaps more
wisely, rejecting the fiction of invitations, that
the nature of the use itself creates the duty • • .
Whatever the underlying principle that explains
the rule, the rule itself is settled."
This case also cites Barrett vs. Lake Ontario
Boachimp. Co. (174Ny310, 66N.E. 969)withapproval
which stated the rule as follows:
"If the premises are rented for a public purpose
for which he (the lessor) knows that they are
unfit and dangerous, he is guilty of negligence
and may become responsible to persons suffering
injury while rightfully using them."

The facts in the case were as follows:
17.

Injuries were sustained by plaintiff who was a
spectator at a hot rod race on the fairgrounds owned b' the
defendant, association. Petition was dismissed on
defendant's motion and an appeal taken. Reversed.

The

Supreme Court held that the Petition stated a cause of
1

action predicating defendant's liability on their leasing
of premises so defective that they could not be safely used
for the express purpose of the lease. This case also deals
with the question of proximate cause.
The following definition of nuisance has an application in the present case:
"A 'nuisance' arises from the creation or
maintenance of a condition having a natural
tendency to cause danger and inflict injury:'
"Where the natural tendency of an act complained of is to create danger and inflict
injury on person or property, it may properly
be found to be a nuisance as a matter of fact,
but where the act in its inherent nature is so
hazardous that the danger of extreme and
serious injury is so probable that it is almost
a certainty, there is a nuisance as a matter
of law." Shoemaker vs. City of Parsons, 118
P. 508, 154 Kan 387 (Italics ours)
Attached to this brief and in view of the fact that
~hrre was no trial of the issues, nor exhibits introduced,
\ie

are taking the liberty of including herein pictures of

18.

tne

benches and armrests taken in the skating rink. They

are marked as Appendix A and B. It should be noted that
there is a small platform from the floor to the riser, then

a step up to the base of the benches. The armrests in
question extend out beyond the seat area itself and over
the base. There is absolutely no protection to a person
projected toward the benches, the skates being stopped at
the area of the sma 11 platform.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's granting Summary Judgment in favor
of the defendant, Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc.,

and Robert E. Sanders and Shirley M. Sanders, husband and
wife, should be reversed and the case remanded to the lower
court for trial under appropriate instructions. Disposition
as this court may determine and plaintiff awarded costs on

appea 1.
Respectfully submitted,
P. LeRoy Nelson and
M. Blaine Peterson
Attorneys for Defendant
512 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
19.

